Mauled by the Maoists

The senseless violence can only be reined in by addressing its causes and responding with empathy rather than force, says C Uday Bhaskar

The last weekend of March has been particularly bloody in terms of Leftwing extremism (LWE) and is a stark reminder of how widespread this phenomenon has become in recent years. On March 24, more than 200 lethally armed Maoist Naxalites laid siege to the town of R Udayagiri in Gajapati district of Orissa and ransacked the local police station, the adjoining barracks, the revenue office and the sub-jail. In the stand-off that followed, three policemen were killed while the extremists succeeded in freeing 40 prisoners and undertrials. In addition, the local jailor and the police chief were taken hostage and the district collector forced to go into hiding since all vestiges of State authority and power had been rendered totally ineffective. The following day, 13 innocent people were killed and four injured in the Pakhanjaur area of Kanker district of north Bastar in Chattisgarh, when Naxals blew up a vehicle carrying them back from the local market. The landmine that blew up the jeep was ostensibly meant for a police vehicle and, again, symbols of State authority were the target.
These are not isolated incidents, and it merits recall that again in March, determined cadres of the Communist Party of India-Maoist captured a whole train for a few hours in Jharkhand as retaliation when one of their zonal commanders was killed in an encounter. And late last year on November 13, about 1,000 Maoists raided the town of Jehanabad—in a manner similar to R Udaygiri—and succeeded in freeing 340 prisoners.

Clearly, the Maoist-Naxal hold over large tracts of the hinterland is becoming more consolidated, and it is estimated that almost 40 per cent of India is affected by LWE of one form or other. This problem figured prominently in the ministry of home affairs' annual report (March 16), which noted gravely, inter alia, that 76 districts in nine states (AP, Bihar, Jharkhand, Chattisgarh, Orissa, Maharashtra, MP, UP and West Bengal) were “badly affected” by this virus. India has a total of 593 districts and an independent survey in late 2005 concluded that as many as 165 districts were Maoist-affected—and on the map, they form the equivalent of a Leftwing corridor that runs right down from West Bengal through to Tamil Nadu and could surface in Kerala and Karnataka.

The figures contained in the report are revealing. Fatalities among security force personnel showed a sharp increase of 53 per cent while civilian casualties went up by 11 per cent as compared to the incidents reported in 2004. In 2005, there were 1,594 incidents of violence as compared to 1,533 in 2004. Casualties among the Maoists also increased from 87 in 2004 to 223 in 2005.

The modus operandi of the Maoists suggests a very high degree of meticulous planning. Informed estimates of the total number of committed cadres puts them at about 7,500 men and women, including many youth. The more alarming pattern is that recruitment is increasing visibly. The weapons and offensive firepower at the disposal of the Maoists indicates that they have access to sizeable funds (often obtained through extortion) and that the LWE network is in touch with the clandestine arms market that thrives on the Indian periphery.

The fact that the LWE groups are able to obtain support from a reasonably large number of disaffected people within 40 per cent of the rural and mofussil cross
-section of India and the fact that they have appropriated many State functions such as revenue collection, the dispensation of a Robin Hood kind of justice and the control of transit routes is cause for concern. The most recent attacks only demonstrate that the Weberian proposition that the State is the only entity that has a monopoly over the use of macro force has been rudely challenged.

As in many cases of domestic extremism and low intensity conflict, the State can respond with overwhelming force to redress a given tactical setback. But, in the long run, the causes of disaffection can only be addressed through empathetic socioeconomic and positive political initiatives. While, post-Bush, there is cause to cheer that India is being gradually recognised as a country with considerable potential to be one of the major powers of the 21st century, these aspirations will remain stunted if the internal security situation is allowed to deteriorate. A calibrated long-term strategy to deal with the menace of LWE that maximises State, private sector and civil society efforts is called for—and urgently at that.