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Bombs in MoD’s tender for explosives scanner
The ministry of defence’s decision to buy explosives scanners has been embroiled incontroversy. The scanners are both exorbitant — one type remains untested and unused worldwide — and have seriously underperformed at the Nhava Sheva port. Now, the MoD is moving to acquire scanners that are of weaker capability than the ones that have already failed..
By Shahid Faridi
The ministry of defence (MoD) has floated a tender to acquire three to five “explosives scanners” to be placed at each of the points of entry into the country.
This is the second time that the MoD is attempting to purchase these scanners, which are crucial for the country — the cargo entering India is, at present, not thoroughly checked either for metallic or non-metallic firearms, ammunition of all calibres, blast weapons like grenades, detonators, timing devices and explosives such as RDX, C4, Semtex, TNT, etc, in threat-level quantities
concealed in the trucks and containers along with the legal
goods or in false compartments and cavities.
The acquisition of these scanners has been embroiled in controversy. The previous time the MoD tried to acquire these scanners, the tender had to be cancelled, after the bids had been received, because of alleged overpricing.
A campaign was launched by Members of Parliament (MPs) against the lowest bidder — Rapiscan Security Products of the US. It was brought to the notice of Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee that the price quoted by this lowest bidder was twice the price at which it was selling the scanners in the US. The price Rapiscan quoted in its India tender was Rs 8.22 crore per piece, while the same device was sold in the US for Rs 4 crore a piece.
Then, there was the question of effectiveness of the scanners. The Central Board of Excise and Customs (CBEC), under the ministry of finance, had acquired a gamma ray-based scanner in 2003 from the same American company that has a tie-up with the Electronics Corporation of India Ltd (ECIL). This scanner was installed at the Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust (JNPT) at Nhava Sheva in Mumbai. This scanner did not meet the requirement of the CBEC. Besides, it never functioned properly.
In a letter dated January 19, 2005 to the ECIL, senior CBEC official Priya V K Singh said: “This is regarding the gamma ray scanner installed and commissioned by M/s ECIL on 29.3.2004 at JNPT, Nhava Sheva. Ever since its commissioning, the container scanner has faced problems of water seepage, short circuiting of PCBs, failure of hydraulic system, failure of sensors, etc. Modifications in both software and hardware have had to be made. Although these problems have been rectified by the vendor’s engineers, electronic scanning of cargo has had to be suspended several times and the cargo cleared without scanning. Moreover, the scanner appears to be of limited or no utility for scanning fully loaded containers as also high density cargo and metal scrap, agricultural and sea products, dense chemicals, etc. Further, the images transmitted by the system are not very clear, which is a major shortcoming, as the interpretation of data is directly related to clarity of the picture. Since there have been serious problems in the functioning of the system, the purpose for which it has been deployed is defeated.
I am, therefore, directed to communicate to you the ministry’s non-satisfaction with the functioning on the system.”
This scanner at Nhava Sheva had the capacity to penetrate 175 mm of steel. The CBEC found this penetration level inadequate, as the scanner failed to scan densely-packed cargo.
Yet the MoD, through its tender last year in which Rapiscan had emerged the winner, wanted to buy x-ray/gamma ray scanners having a penetrative capability of 150 mm steel.
But the latest tender floated by the MoD on August 3, 2005 takes the cake. In this tender, the ministry has asked for a penetration capability of only 75 mm of steel.
If CBEC did not find the gamma ray scanner having the capacity to penetrate 175 mm steel of no utility, one wonders what the use would be of scanners with having 75 mm penetration capability.
When some vendors pointed out to the MoD that the penetration level it has asked for would be of no use as nothing would be visible in the picture, the MoD clarified the matter through a letter dated October 3, 2005 that is a classic example of bureaucratic obfuscation: “...worldwide the penetration levels that are normally asked for are 150 mm to 450 mm and the preferred level being 200 mm. Some of the countries which have issued tenders with penetration levels of 150 mm to 250 mm within the last 12 months are UK, USA, Russia, South Africa, Mozambique, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Argentina, Mexica, Estonia, Poland, Slovakia, Belgium, Denmark, France, Bahrain, Sri Lanka, Kuwait.” The letter then goes on to say that “the firm may offer a good solution keeping in view its expertise and our overall requirement as per RFP [Requirement for Proposal].”
This effectively means that even though most countries were going for maximum penetration, the MoD will stick to its RFP requirement of 75 mm.
The latest tender has also invited bids for scanners based on Thermal Neutron Analysis (TNA) and Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis (PFNA) technologies. TNA and PFNA are not proven technologies and, therefore, not a single scanner based on this technology is being used anywhere in the world. The MoD plans to purchase three to five of these scanners, which cost between US$ 10 million and US$ 15 million.
Questions, therefore, arise as to who and what these scanners are being bought for, spending huge amounts of public money.
A large number of MPs have once again written to the defence minister and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh asking them to look into the arbitrary manner in which tender conditions are being framed by officers. They have demanded that an expert committee be set up to examine the entire range of scanners and scanning technologies available in the world and select the one that is best suited to the country’s needs.
The representations by MPs have once again put a question mark on the fate of the MoD’s latest tender. Till such time that there is clarity in policy and transparency in the selection process, cargo — some of it undoubtedly of questionable use — will continue to flow into India unscanned.
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