India-US nuke deal

Pusillanimity leavened with righteous obduracy is far removed from ethical realpolitik, that is, enlightened self-interest cognizant of the collective vision, which should inform the unrelenting pursuit of national interest,
says C Uday Bhaskar

When the India-US civilian nuclear cooperation agreement was first mooted in July 2005, the very radical scope of what was being envisaged took the two principal interlocutors and the global nuclear community by complete surprise. The very bitter bone of contestation that had soured the US-India bilateral relationship for 31 years – India's nuclear aspirations and anxieties - an issue that had successfully isolated India from the global nuclear peer group, was being innovatively converted into an area of potential cooperation with far reaching implications that could alter the strategic architecture of the 21st century.

The general assessment the world over was that India was 'having its cake and eating it too', for July 2005 allowed India – a non-signatory to the NPT - to retain its modest nuclear arsenal, even while being admitted into the global nuclear loop. And this, with India not being particularly close to the US in either strategic or security terms. At an international conference that I had attended later in 2005 in the USA, a senior Israeli participant took me aside and said: "Israel would give its right arm to get a similar dispensation from the USA."

However few could have anticipated that the July 18, 2005 (J 1805) agreement would lead to the kind of political tempest that it did in India in the latter half of 2007. By the time the text of the 123 agreement with the US was finalized, most of India's core concerns had been addressed. Yet the opposition to the 'deal' was vehement and at one point it appeared as if the UPA government would fall leading to a mid-term election. External observers were perplexed and puzzled. Why was India rejecting what was an exceptional opportunity that would end its isolation and enhance its global profile? The answer perhaps lies in the manner in which some constituencies in the Indian political establishment interpret realpolitik and their individual interest in relation to the abiding national interest and the deeper cultural DNA that shapes their policies and actions. Inflexible ideological conviction, opportunistic posturing and coalition diffidence characterize the Left parties, the BJP and the Congress respectively as regards the trajectory of J 1805 over the last six months. Now the results of the Gujarat elections have further muddied the waters.

At the time of writing this comment, it is evident that the UPA government has been able to prevail upon the Left to let the consultations with the IAEA proceed and it is expected that this 'complex' India-specific protocol will be concluded in early January. This will be brought back to the UPA-Left Committee for consideration – where one hopes that it will not flounder – and then submitted to the Cabinet for approval. From this stage, the scene shifts to the NSG – where again it is expected that there will be opposition from some quarters – but that the combined weight of the USA, Russia, France and UK would be able to swing the vote in India's favor. The final act is for the US Congress to study the various parallel tracks – viz: India-IAEA and India-NSG and the put the issue to an up-down vote, which again is expected to be ‘yes’.

On current evidence, I remain cautiously optimistic that J 1805 will move forward – albeit haltingly. Pulling down the UPA government is not a viable, cost-free option for the opposition parties and for the Congress to not push ahead with J 1805 would erode its own credibility at the next hustings. To the extent that almost all of India's core concerns and expectations have been met in the different stages of this protracted negotiations, the opposition to J 1805 is not substantive in objective terms but part of the political posturing that individual parties have adopted.

However since political outcomes are inherently unpredictable, the exigency that J 1805 is either scuttled or kept in suspension must be considered. In such an eventuality, it would be fair to infer that India's current leadership would have a heavy cross to bear. Not only would India's current standing in the global comity be sullied for its recalcitrant timidity, the overall strategic space for India would be progressively diminished. Like the Sisyphean rock, India-US bilateral ties at the official level could return to their former estrangement over the nuclear issue. Furthermore, despite the empathy exuded by Moscow and Paris, New Delhi will remain outside the global tent that is seeking to grapple with the nuclear related challenges of the 21st century. Whether it is disarmament or non-proliferation, India's voice will be unheard in the relevant forum.
Pusillanimity leavened with righteous obduracy is far removed from ethical realpolitik (enlightened self-interest that is cognizant of the collective vision) that should inform the unrelenting pursuit of the national interest. January 2008 will give us a better sense of which nuclear path India will traverse.

( Uday Bhaskar is a senior defence and strategic affairs analyst).