Safety derailed, as Lalu chugs on

The sole protest to Lalu’s mindless wagon- and load-addition spree has come from the railway's safety chief—the creaking bridges that could give way any moment

By Our Correspondent

Lalu Prasad Yadav has brazened himself out of worse scrapes with his trademark barnyard grin, and it's unlikely that a mere commissioner's lambasting will make him lose it. And since Indian ministers rarely lose their jobs over little things like endangering public safety, you can expect more new Laluisms than straight answers, which the just-released damning report from the Chief Commissioner of Railway Safety is seeking. For, though strongly worded, it's hardly the sort of stuff that would stop Lalu in his tracks. Indeed, given a quarter—or even less—of a chance, you can trust the grin to keep widening, the railway tonnage to mount to dangerous levels, and the sagging century-old bridges to creak for mercy.

Lalu's incident-free stint as railway minister contrasts starkly with that of his predecessors', whose tenures were all marred by recurring mishaps—many of them the result of poor bridge maintenance. The report quotes several departmental surveys to conclude that 44 per cent of the bridges are more than 100 years old, and 74 per cent 60-plus years old.

The scores of new gauge conversions, and the arrival of new age locomotives, have added fresh urgency to the bridge-building programme. But it can begin only after studying the foundation details and the completion of the structural drawings, many of which the railway's zonal offices are unable to trace. And most bridges remain submerged round the year.

Meanwhile new and heavier locomotives and wagons are being added to routes already catering to old and new fleets of 100-kmph freight trains. Yet, rather than admit the lapse, all these zonal bodies have been pressing Railway headquarters to sanction the running of this rolling stock without caring to locate the missing bridge verification records.

It was after the Mangalore-Chennai Central Mail accident of June 22, 2001—when bridge no 924 collapsed near Kadalundi, killing 52 passengers and injuring 300—that the authorities decided to make bridge repair and reconstruction a national priority. The railways launched a series of underwater inspections and directed the zonal offices of all four railways—Southern, North Central, Central and Northern—to submit new and old data of the bridges' completion and foundation drawings.

But the documents never arrived: what did was mail soliciting bridge certificates for the introduction of heavier axle loads and higher speeds. How, asks the Chief Commissioner of Railway Safety's report, is it possible to sanction new locomotive movement without first studying the bridges' structural details, the dimensions of its various components and their stress calculations?
On the basis of those post-disaster 2000-01 projections, the ministry earmarked Rs 1,530 crore out of the Special Railway Safety Fund for repair and rebuilding of the "distressed" bridges. But work on their identification has been slothful. Several pilot projects that were sanctioned two years ago are way behind schedule. Yet, rather than take them to task, the officials have gone on a wagon-overloading-cum-addition spree, far above current carrying capacities, without securing speed certificates from the Railway Design and Standards Organisation (RDSO). Old bridges designed for lighter traffic have become very vulnerable.

However, since traffic volumes can only be regulated, and not substantially lowered, and theoretical checks cannot be carried out in all—particularly along the submerged sections—the engineers are being told to keep the bridges under close watch and certify their physical conditions. They are to inform the ministry wherever the completed gauge conversions require upgrading. On the "weak bridge routes", the drivers have been instructed to slow down to the slowest "fifth" notch.
Accordingly, even as the stupendous nature of underwater bridge inspection is comprehended, the RDSO is asking engineers to identify “performing” routes. The railway board has claimed that underwater inspection of nearly 300 bridges is through, adding: "Regarding enhancement of the carrying capacity of wagons, it is to be stated that BOXN [open top] wagon was introduced on Indian Railways in 1982. Due procedure was followed at the time of introduction of BOXN wagons. Since then track and rolling stock technology and maintenance practices have improved considerably. A detailed analysis of rail stresses shows that there are many grey areas in calculations. Value of track modulus is very old and is of CST-9 track. It is seen that although the old bridges were designed to old standards, yet they continue to be in good physical condition and giving good service."

And while praising the "initial quality of construction", the board lists various technical points to justify the steadily mounting wagon loads.

But the commission isn't buying any of this and insists: "The need for hurriedness with which the higher loading, over and above the designed carrying capacity of wagons, has been introduced, without ensuring the implementation of the conditions prescribed by the ministry of railways for bridges in the field, is not understood…A rising trend in level-crossing accidents and fatalities has been witnessed in recent years. The ongoing expansion and strengthening of road networks has created enhanced pressure on manned level crossings [LCs] and unmanned gates now have increased potential for accidents."

The commission says the pace of manning must not jeopardise the maintenance of railway assets, and urges the creation of gatemen's posts and new training programmes. It adds: "Apart from not de-manning of existing level crossings and not constructing new unmanned LCs during new construction, safety devices like ACD [Anti-Collision Device] and TAWDs [Train Actuated Warning Device] would be installed on a programmed basis on all unmanned LC gates to warn road users suitably. Grade separation should be provided on new lines/gauge conversion/ doubling/multiplexing/strengthening works under RVNL [Railway Vikas Nigam Ltd], as well as existing lines."

The commission has also found that although the rules provide for lighting up indicators at night, power shortages rule them out. "Reliance is placed only on the caution order issued to the driver. In some cases, attempts are made to improve the visibility of the indicators by painting them with reflective paint or attaching reflective strips to it. But this is done infrequently, and even when it is [it is] not maintained properly." This can be fatal in sections where identification and assessment work is in progress. Says the commission: "Thus the observance of the speed restriction (generally 20 kmph) on the work spot within the station limits depends solely on the driver." It's why it wants the warner/distant signals to stay—a bit of cautionary advice that Southern Railway has blithely ignored.

For the automated sections, the commission wants data-loggers to generate reports of drivers who overshoot the red signals and fail to lower speeds when trains move past them. It also seeks the installation of vigilance control devices and voice recorders in all locomotives, and anti-collision devices—especially on high-speed routes where slow-moving trains are most likely to get tailgated.
The commission is concerned that flasher lights do not automatically switch on in the automated sections when locomotives derail. Audible warnings and road warning lights at manned level-crossing gates must be prioritised.

And, to minimise the scope of human error, it would have all drivers put on a breathalyser, and the results recorded.

The commission lists several major accidents, and the investigators' findings for each-most of which were duly filed, and duly forgotten. And with Lantern Lalu leading the way, every time the green signal has shone, the safety personnel have known there are more wagons on the cards.
Ask those poor bridges.