North Korean nuclear nettle:
impasse breakthrough?

Despite the probable détente, Pyongyang retains its missile capability and a deterrent strategic profile, however rudimentary., says C Uday Bhaskar

The much anticipated breakthrough in the six-party talks that sought to break the impasse over the North Korean nuclear nettle came about on Tuesday, February 13, after six days of intensive negotiations. The six nations represented in Beijing at the talks—the US, North Korea, China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea—were able to announce that Pyongyang would end its nuclear programme in return for security guarantees and energy assistance. This breakthrough—however tentative—was more than welcome, for, after the nuclear test carried out by North Korea in October 2006, the global community has been engaged in inconclusive consultation on how best to arrive at a modus-vivendi to deal with Pyongyang's ostensible defiance.

Under the current agreement, the other five members to the talks are committed to provide the Hermit Kingdom with 500,000 tonnes of oil or its equivalent in economic aid; on its part, Pyongyang has agreed to “shut down and seal” the Yongbyon nuclear reactor within 60 days and to allow International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors to return to North Korea to conduct inspections.

The North Korean nuclear imbroglio is not of recent origin—its ontological roots are embedded in the Korean War of 1953 and the Cold War decades—and the contours of a nuclear resolution were initially mooted in 1994 during the first term of the Clinton administration. At the time, the Pyongyang regime (led by the late senior Kim Jong-Il, father of the current ruler) had agreed to suspend its nuclear weapons programme in return for economic and energy aid and the supply of light water reactors that were proliferation-resistant.

However, given the bitterly antagonistic relationship between the Democrats and the Republicans in the US during the Clinton years, this agreement collapsed, with both sides citing non-compliance with the letter and spirit of the accord. Over the years, Pyongyang has been able to defy the US and its allies with some tacit support from Beijing and was emboldened to carry out a nuclear test to establish its nuclear weapon credibility. In this period, it was often averred that the US, from Bill Clinton to George W Bush, had different standards for Iraq and now Iran, as compared to its carrots-and-more-carrots approach to North Korea.

The fact of the matter is that North Korea has joined—albeit as a 'dwarf' nuclear weapon power—the eight-member nuclear club of five (the US, Russia, the UK, France, and China) plus two (India and Pakistan) plus one (Israel). Pyongyang also has an indigenous missile capability and, thus, a deterrent strategic profile, however rudimentary. To that extent, compellence in the classical sense has not worked, for no major power will take the risk of pushing North Korea beyond the tipping-point where it may retaliate with weapons of mass destruction aimed at its proximate neighbours. But it merits repetition that the February 13 agreement is a very nascent work in progress. Much will depend on how the principal interlocutors abide by their respective commitments. Like the proverbial snakes-and-ladders game, the North Korean issue has held out many false promises that were not honoured and a tedious blame-game is part of the track record. And even as North Korea is moving towards meaningful negotiations, the world is confronted with the Iranian non-compliance of its IAEA commitments.

By unintended coincidence, even as the six-party talks were on in Beijing, Iran celebrated the 28th anniversary of the 1979 Islamic Revolution on February 11. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, recalling the nationalist fervour that imbued the Khomeini Revolution, rejected the international pressure on Teheran and vowed to carry on with the uranium enrichment programme. However, he simultaneously reiterated that Iran would not violate its Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) commitments as a non-nuclear weapons state.

In the Iranian case, the UN Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 1737 in December 2006 calling upon Teheran to suspend all nuclear fuel cycle activities by February 21 or face more stringent sanctions. The fact that all the permanent members of the UNSC have closed ranks on the Iranian nuclear issue sends a strong signal to Teheran and the outcome of events post-February 21 will have a very significant bearing on regional stability and the global energy matrix. India has a major stake in the outcome of the Iranian issue; and while it is not part of the UNSC, it is instructive that the Joint Communiqué issued after the February 14 meeting of the foreign ministers of Russia, China and India in Delhi noted, inter alia, that “…cooperation rather than confrontation should govern approaches to regional and global affairs”.

The hopeful signs apropos the North Korean nettle augur well for the Iranian imbroglio—but there is no dearth of banana peels in Washington and Teheran or, for that matter, in Pyongyang