Beyond the dissonance

President Hu's visit to the US was all about projecting China's image as a friendly giant panda. But this makeover of the dragon has implications for the whole world—Asia in particular—where the region's two other major powers, India and Japan, are affected, says C Uday Bhaskar

The Sino-US relationship, and the manner in which it evolves, has the potential to shape the strategic architecture of the first half of the 21st century, even as the international systemic is grappling with the relentless dynamic of globalisation. However, since Tiananmen of 1989 and the tectonic events that have followed, such as the end of the Cold War, the US-led war for Kuwait and the still simmering fallout of 9/11, the Washington-Beijing relationship is characterised by complex contradictions, and many of these latent tensions were discernible when Chinese president Hu Jintao was received at the White House on Friday, April 20.

Alas, it got off to a less than auspicious start and the dissonances were evident in both form and substance. For president Hu, and the Chinese strategic culture where 'public face' is crucial, the detail attached to protocol and the redness of the red carpet welcome had to be precisely correct for the benefit of the billion-plus Chinese back home. However, Bush opted not to make this a traditional state visit—for that would entail a grand banquet dinner—and, instead, hosted an official lunch. A minor detail, but the nuance was not lost on Beijing.

Worse was to follow. An American citizen of Chinese origin managed to join the media contingent covering the Bush-Hu White House reception and heckled the Chinese leader. And, to compound matters, the official name used for China when the national anthems were being played referred to the Republic of China which is the delicate diplomatic nom de plume for Taiwan! Further, in his remarks, Bush unambiguously urged his guest to strive for religious freedom and democracy—clearly very sensitive issues for the Chinese leader as far as 'public face' was concerned. Predictably, there was no joint statement or a sense that this was a meaningful Bush-Hu mini-summit that would address the many anxieties that the US and China have about each other.
China has become synonymous with many deep-seated anxieties that animate the US currently and these range from complex strategic and security issues to those pertaining to the trade, economic and fiscal domain, as also human rights and democracy. Not all of these are unfounded and the US is grappling with the reality of the 'rise' of China—an inexorable reality that Beijing, under Hu, insists is “peaceful”. Clearly, the self-image that China wishes to project is that of a friendly giant panda, making its way into the 21st century, but this makeover of the dragon seems to have few takers in the US.

On the politico-military-strategic front, the US and China perceive each other warily as competitors, if not rivals. If Iran and North Korea are prominent on the US radar, China is equally concerned about Taiwan and Tibet, and the regimes on both sides are disturbed about the potential of the 'other' to rock the boat. Beijing is worried that it is being tethered by a US-led ring and, in turn, China's visible support to dictatorships and authoritarian and Left-leaning regimes—in Asia, Africa and Latin America—to further its own strategic interests, are at total variance with the Bush penchant to nurture democracy. The latter determinant, democracy, is the proverbial red rag for Beijing when it comes to Taiwan, and many of these contentious issues were addressed less than satisfactorily during Hu's visit. However, many of the specific nettles—Iran and North Korea, for instance—are not purely bilateral and some of the contours of the complexities are opaque. In the politico-strategic arena, the US will have to reluctantly accept the emerging balance of power framework wherein China holds certain spades—a point that Hu more than drove home to his Texan host.

Against this, trade, economic and fiscal matters are more visible and seemingly bilateral. They are uppermost in Washington right now—more so in an election year for the US Congress. Most Americans are deeply concerned about the impact of globalisation on domestic employment and there is a strongly held conviction that many US jobs have either been outsourced or lost to China—and India.

Some of the more commonly-touted figures are the trade imbalance. In 2005, the US had a trade deficit of $203 billion with China, which was 27 per cent of its current account deficit. Inexpensive consumer goods manufactured in China have flooded the US market—and while China’s low-wage factor allows the average US citizen to maintain a certain level of consumption, the flip side is a deep anxiety about this level of trade dependency. The US has been demanding that China revalue its currency, but this is a cosmetic fix for the deeper structural malaise that the US has—that of an abysmally low national savings rate of 1 per cent, against China’s almost 40 per cent.

The more abiding fear in the US is that—whether panda or dragon—China is poised to become the world's de facto number one economy. Currently, the US GDP, in actual terms (for 2005), is $11.7 trillion. China crossed the trillion mark in 2005 and is now poised at $1.7 trillion, or a 10th of the US economy. As per projections by Goldman Sachs, all things being equal, China is slated to overtake the US in 2041 to have the world's largest GDP at $28 trillion. However, in purchasing power parity terms, the differential is much lower and it is estimated that China may overtake the US within the next two decades.

The rise of China has implications for the whole world—and Asia, in particular—where the two other major powers, Japan and India, are directly affected. Based on current articulation and policy initiatives of Beijing, it appears that China is not yet reconciled to a truly multipolar or polycentric Asia that accommodates the aspirations of Japan and India while assuaging their anxieties. Yet, as the Hu visit demonstrates, China is keen to see the emergence of a multipolar/polycentric order in the 21st century wherein Washington will acknowledge and facilitate the admittance of Beijing to the high table of responsible powers.

In the current visit, the US and China agreed that they were “stakeholders” in nurturing the stability and continued economic prosperity of the emerging global systemic. And while the US business community recognises the mutually-beneficial trade partnership, the strategic and security domain remains prickly. This was evident in the references by both leaders to issues such as Taiwan and WMD proliferation. The Hu visit was all about introducing the Chinese leader to the global stage—which means the US—and it is evident that both leaders have not moved very much in changing the strongly-held perception about the 'other'.

From the Indian perspective, while the India-US nuclear deal did not figure specifically, the fallout of the Hu visit will be important for Delhi. The basic premise of the Bush-Manmohan Singh agreement of July 2005 and March 2006 is that it was not about 'containing' China and that India has sought equally robust ties with both Washington and Beijing. Thus, any dissonance or turbulence in the US-China relationship would be less than desirable in stabilising the US-India-China triangle. A stable balance of power, accommodation of interests and respect for domestic sensitivities among these three nations is called for and will entail skilful diplomacy and negotiations by all three nations and their leadership.

In the emerging strategic-security and techno-trade architecture of the 21st century, the former determinants will be shaped by the ruling elite of the major powers and their highest politico-military establishments. However, every one of the three national leaderships is deeply aware that the forces of globalisation and the free-market are not susceptible to state diktat and are relentless in their permeation of national economies and societies. And the impact of these undercurrents on their domestic populace presents complex challenges, as the Bush-Hu-Singh combine are all too aware. Despite the many asymmetries in their political, economic, military and socio-cultural characteristics, the US, China and India have a strategic convergence in arriving at a mutually acceptable equipoise in their trilateral relationship.