India makes its move in Central Asia

With Uzbekistan using its massive oil and gas reserves clout to fearfully play nations against one another, the Indian Prime Minister’s visit there is of particular significance—India is a ‘safe’ ally

By Suvrokamal Dutta

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's recent visit to the strategic Central Asian nation of Uzbekistan was a watershed for several reasons, particularly the pro-India turn that the Uzbek leadership has taken in its foreign policy and economic issues.

Uzbekistan's musculature lies in its location within a vaporised CIS. The disintegration of the former Soviet Union had seen the rise of five new Central Asian republics, some of which chose to retain a close contact with Russia and some that sought to distance themselves from what they saw was a Stalinist regime sinking under the onslaught of rampant capitalism, in which they saw some personal gain.

With an economy that was one of the strongest in Central Asia—with an annual growth rate of around 7.5 per cent—Uzbekistan became a major attraction for major powers such as Russia, China, the US and the European Union. The country tried to play one major power against the other, resulting, in self-made complications.

After its independence, Uzbekistan maintained very close relations with Pakistan, which successfully used its clout there to disseminate anti-India propaganda. Politically speaking, Uzbekistan has taken, at worst, a hostile stand, and, at best, a neutral one, in relation to India in all international and regional fora. The negative impact of this was serious, and India felt it in the Organisation of Islamic Countries and so on. Uzbekistan also supported Pakistan's Jammu and Kashmir position.

Matters, however, took a turn with the collapse of the Taliban in Afghanistan, which broke up into splinter groups, some of which, supported by the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence and the al-Qaeda, began creating trouble in Central Asia, including Uzbekistan. Uzbek areas bordering Afghanistan emerged as new regions of terrorist activity, posing a serious danger to the territorial integrity of the country and its secular government. (Although Uzbekistan is 90 per cent Muslim, its government and Constitution are fiercely secular.) The rise of Islamic fundamentalism meant a threat to its fragile democracy. Pakistan's busybody attitude resulted in a shift in Uzbekistan's foreign policy.

After independence, Uzbekistan also retained a very close relationship to Russia. Its president, Islam Karimov, had had a long innings of political experience in the former Soviet Union government. With the passage of time, however, the Uzbek government began to feel suffocated by almost pathological and paranoiac Russian interference in its internal affairs. In order to checkmate this, it began courting the West, especially the US, resulting in an inflow of huge Western and American foreign direct investment and the entry of many Western and American multinational corporations. In the long run, however, this proliferation of Western profiteering enterprises turned out to be a bigger threat for the country than Russia ever was. Uzbekistan might be democratic, but president Karimov rules like a Constitutional dictator and does not tolerate opposition to his rule.

American policy experts and MNCs began to interfere in Uzbekistan's domestic policies, supporting the opposition parties against Karimov, which obviously resulted in tonnes of bad blood. It wasn't long after that the Americans were unequivocally told to wind up operations in the country and depart. Simultaneously, the Uzbek government was becoming extremely worried by anti-government and pro-West activities in other Central Asian nations, particularly the Orange Revolution in its immediate neighbourhood, the Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Georgia, etc, and the installation there of puppet Western governments. Uzbekistan reverted to its tried-and-tested ties with Russia.

In its south, the country needed a reliable partner to counter the West and stymie the export of terrorism from Pakistan and the Taliban. It couldn't take Chinese help because of its fear that China would, as is its wont, begin dominating Central Asia. At the same time, it needed a country that could neutralise the Chinese and Pakistani influence in the region but that would refrain from meddling in its internal affairs. In this chessboard of strategic pitfalls, India fit the bill.
Uzbekistan also needs advanced technology as well as massive foreign investment to tap its huge mineral resources, especially oil and natural gas, a fact that had attracted the West to it, in the first place. The country has around 594 million barrels of proven oil reserves and 66.2 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. The Uzbek government now feels that it can get advanced drilling technology from India at a relatively cheap cost—and with no danger of India interfering in its domestic politics. This is where the courting of India has come in, and the importance of Manmohan Singh's visit lies.
The spadework was done during the Vajpayee government, and Manmohan Singh's government has further solidified it. During his recent visit, the prime minister signed seven pacts, and memoranda of understanding (including one between the ministry of petroleum and natural gas, the Government of India and the Uzbekistan National Holding Company, Uzbekneftegaz) with the Uzbek government. Besides, agreements were also signed in the fields of coal, tourism, Information Technology, tourism, etc. The announcement by the Uzbek president that Uzbekistan was ready to allocate geological territory to Indian companies to explore the resources of gas, oil and other hydrocarbon products, and that the products of the exploration could be shared on a 50-50 basis, was historic in itself. (So far, no Indian oil companies have signed MOU's with any other country for oil exploration on a 50-50 basis.)

These agreements provide India with a golden opportunity to quench its energy thirst from so-called alternative areas in the world. After the recent stalemate between India and Iran over the latter's nuclear fuel production issue, the much-touted gas pipeline project has been in the doldrums and India needed desperately a new area to fulfil its oil requirements. Uzbekistan came to the rescue bang on time.

The issuing of a joint statement by the two countries to together tackle and fight international terrorism, and Uzbekistan’s support to India's claims to the expanded United Nations Security Council, are a clear indication of better ties between the two largely disparate countries—and, not so incidentally, a direct rebuke to Pakistan's strategy in Central Asia. Uzbekistan has given India, for the first time, a golden opportunity to play a deterrent role in Central Asian politics. Hopefully, India will play it well.

(The writer is a foreign affairs and economics expert)