Myanmar and India’s
realpolitik conundrum

Strategic interests constrain India's reaction in balancing realpolitik with moralpolitik with regard to the situation in Myanmar, says C Uday Bhaskar

Recent developments in Myanmar and the crackdown by the ruling military junta against the Buddhist monks has posed a serious politico-diplomatic and security challenge for India — the world's largest democracy.

The current turbulence in Myanmar began in mid-August with the junta deciding to increase the price of fuel — petrol and diesel by almost a hundred percent, while natural gas was estimated to have been increased five-fold. The resultant burden on the already deeply impoverished Myanmar citizen, whose per capita income is estimated to be among the lowest in the world at US $300 per annum became the proverbial tipping point and street protests — otherwise unheard of in Myanmar — after the 8-8-88 massacre by the junta — began. The unexpected addition this time was the lead taken by the Buddhist monks of Myanmar, an otherwise politically neutral constituency. Given the deep reverence in which the clergy are held by this largely Buddhist nation, the military leadership reacted with disproportionate force and the net result was the death of about 15 people, including monks, and a Japanese photo-journalist.

Global reaction gradually hardened against the Myanmar generals and by early October a familiar pattern emerged. The United States led the West in denouncing the junta and demanded there be a swift redressal through dialogue with due respect for human rights. Even Japan cut off a U.S. $ 7 million aid package to convey its ire over the death of a Japanese national. However the three major interlocutors who have engaged with the junta — namely China, Asean and India, have chosen to take a more muted position and have variously urged reconciliation, even while emphasising that coercion would not be advisable and that the riots and protests were essentially an internal matter. It is understood that through private channels and quiet diplomacy, these three dialogue partners have put whatever pressure they could on the Myanmar generals.
Perhaps due to this concerted international effort, the junta has made some modest concessions including a much publicised meeting with the face of democracy in Myanmar — dissident leader and Nobel Peace prize winner — Aung San Suu Kyi , as also allowing the special representative of the UNSG, Ibrahim Gambari, to meet the military leaders.

India has been characteristically low profile given the trajectory that the bilateral relationship with Myanmar has taken over the last few decades. There was a time when with Rajiv Gandhi at the helm, India came out strongly in support of the pro-democracy movement but to little avail. The net result was that India was projected by the Myanmar military as their enemy number one and China filled the politico-diplomatic void by extending valuable support to the Yangon regime that was increasingly isolated.
Slowly the damage was repaired in the early 1990s in the Narasimha Rao years for India's internal security challenges in the Northeast — particularly Mizoram — were being adversely affected by this estrangement with the regime in Yangon. India muted its support for democracy as a realpolitik choice and engaged the military leadership as it has with other non-democracies be it Pakistan or China among its neighbours. Progressively hydro-carbon rich Myanmar provided opportunities for India's energy security and more recently, a strategic multi-modal transport link that will connect Mizoram with Thailand through Myanmar is on the anvil. Thus, there are many long term strategic interests that constrain India's freedom of action as far as balancing realpolitk with moralpolitik is concerned and this is reflected in the very low key Indian response in the face of the fire and brimstone that the United States has been exuding over Myanmar.

India will have to evolve a consensual approach with China and Asean in being able to influence the generals of Myanmar but it will not be easy. New Delhi's dilemma is best summed up by Hans Morgenthau, who noted: "To act successfully, that is, according to the rules of the political act, is political wisdom. To know with despair that the political act is inevitably evil and to act nevertheless is moral courage. To choose among several expedient actions the least evil is moral judgment. In the combination of political wisdom, moral courage and moral judgment, man reconciles his political nature with his moral destiny." He further added, "The choice is not between moral principles and national interests devoid of moral dignity but between one set of moral principles divorced from political reality, and another set of moral principles derived from political reality."

India is not alone among major democracies in facing this catch 22 situation — finding the appropriate equipoise between realpolitik and moralpolitik. The forthcoming Asean summit in October may be an opportunity for New Delhi to enhance its credibility apropos Myanmar and its oppressed monks.

( Uday Bhaskar is a senior defence and strategic affairs analyst).