Presidential election:
Pakistan in a pickle

Musharraf has promised to shed uniform after getting reelected, but whether he’ll win is moot. His return is in our best interests, says C Uday Bhaskar

Beleaguered but determined to retain his high office, Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf has decided to seek re-election on October 6. The only concession he has made is that he will doff his uniform—his ‘second skin’—if he is elected. There are many banana peels that lurk in his path, ranging from the threat of en masse resignation by the opposition All-Parties Democratic Movement (APDM) legislators; the judiciary keeping a watchful eye on the military-political divide; the mood on the Pakistani street getting increasingly restive—and, most significantly—an open threat to the astute general from the al-Qaeda leadership, which has exhorted the people of Pakistan to overthrow him.

Notwithstanding these multiple challenges, it is likely that the general will prevail. This may well be in the larger interest of Pakistan and the extended South Asian region. This assertion might be confirmed by the time this comment sees print. My reasons for taking such a position are that the political opposition to General Musharraf has not cohered into a cohesive domestic force, and that the ontological differences between Nawaz Sharief and Benazir Bhutto, as also the rank opportunism of other parties such as the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) preclude such an exigency.

Second, the military continues to be the most powerful institution in Pakistan, not merely because it wields the gun but also since it controls vast economic and fiscal assets. Thus, whichever civilian dispensation comes to govern the troubled state will have to rely on the ‘fauj’—and General Musharraf has just appointed senior officers loyal to him to key positions, including that of the director-general of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). (Lt Gen Nadeem Taj, the new ISI chief, was Musharraf’s military assistant in October 1999 when Nawaz Sharief was overthrown.) And the reason why whoever governs Pakistan after October 6 will have to depend on the military is the latest bin Laden tape that is rabblerousing at its shrillest pitch.

The invective heaped on General Musharraf, who has been denounced as an American puppet and an apostate who has used the army of Islam against its own people, is cause for some concern and reflection, both in Pakistan and India. This tape makes reference to the Lal Masjid operation in Islamabad and compares it with the Babri Masjid demolition in India. Two sections warrant recall. (I am grateful to B Raman, India’s foremost terrorism expert, for this translation.) Bin Laden says: “Pervez’s invasion of the Lal Masjid in the City of Islam, Islamabad, is a sad event, like the crime of the Hindus in their invasion and destruction of the Babri Masjid. This event demonstrated Musharraf’s insistence on continuing his loyalty, submissiveness and aid to America against the Muslims.” And the direct exhortation to the Pakistani fauj is: “O Pervez, his ministers, his soldiers and those who help him are all accomplices in the spilling the blood of those of the Muslims who have been killed.

I tell the soldiers who perform the Salaat (prayer) in the military organs: you must resign from your jobs and enter anew into Islam and dissociate yourself from Pervez and his Shirk (anti-Islamism).”

General Musharraf has been the target of the religious radicals since December 2003, when his motorcade was attacked. There was speculation even at the time that the security cordon around him had been infiltrated by the jehadi elements. Over the past four years, various operations by the Pakistani military that have targeted al-Qaeda cadres have increased the anger of the radicals. The Lal Masjidoperation was the last straw. Hence, this latest taped message is aimed at the Pakistani street—where, alas, Osama bin Laden is seen as amore popular figure than any Pakistani leader.

Under the circumstances, if the level of internal discord and jehadi violence increases, all the principal players in Pakistan—and, more importantly, the country’s external support base, the US and Saudi Arabia—are more likely to support a Musharraf re-election. The uniform issue will be of secondary importance. In any case, General Musharraf has taken adequate measures to ensure that he doesnot meet the fate of Field Marshal Ayub Khan, Pakistan’s first military ruler.

The realpolitik relevance for India is in the prioritisation of issues vis-à-vis Pakistan. Yes, a truly credible and suitably empowered democratic, civilian leadership is highly desirable in the long run. But in the short term, it may be more prudent to let General Musharraf deal firmly with religious extremism in his country, as evidenced in recent months. This cusp in Pakistan’s trajectory is ironic: the Pakistani fauj had carefully nurtured these very forces for three decades, and now it is Musharraf’s call—to stop running with the hare and hunting with the hounds. Inshallah, he will prevail: it is in our
collective interest.

( Uday Bhaskar is a senior defence and strategic affairs analyst).