India-US nuclear deal: Jackals and Hydel

The Left and the BJP are engaged in an anti-US battle of socio-political perversity with the UPA government over a nuclear deal that can enhance India's energy capability and global standing, says C Uday Bhaskar

At the time of writing, the opposition to the India-US civilian nuclear agreement, first mooted on July 18, 2005 (J 1805), from the Left parties who are part of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) coalition, remains firm. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has exuded a quiet confidence that the matter can be resolved through debate and discussion, both within Parliament and outside it. The Left has announced that it will also oppose the joint naval exercises in early September, which India will participate in along with the US, Japan, Australia and Singapore.

Clearly, contestation in Indian politics has gone beyond the intricate details of the civilian nuclear agreement itself—since embodied in the 123 text—and the core issue now is more about how India ought to relate to the US. The major political parties, including the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the Opposition and the Left in the UPA coalition, have interpreted the 123 agreement along with the Hyde Act selectively to suggest that India is mortgaging its sovereignty and that the legal implications embedded in these two documents are fraught with grave danger for India's national interest.
Earlier in the public debate that has animated India since July 2005, it was suggested that three issues were of critical concern to India: the right to retain its nuclear weapons while remaining outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and be able to conduct a nuclear test, if need be; the right to reprocess spent fuel, since this exigency is critical to India's three-stage civilian nuclear programme; and, finally, the guarantee of adequate fuel supplies and other appropriate guarantees to ward off untoward eventualities a la Tarapur.

Thus, we have two sets of issues. One is substantive, by way of the three critical concerns enumerated above; the second is a legal interpretation of the 123 text and the Hyde Act. It merits recall that these concerns have been satisfactorily addressed in the final text of the 123 agreement, and this has been acknowledged by the seniormost scientists in the Indian atomic establishment, both within the government and those retired. India, they aver, could not have got a better deal than that represented in the final text of the 123. The validation was a semantic tour de force, a victory for both George W Bush and Manmohan Singh.

One of the most lucid and insightful commentaries on the 123 and the Hyde Act has been authored by eminent lawyer and commentator A G Noorani (Hindustan Times, August 23, 2007). It is objective and offers the most accurate interpretation devoid of any political distortion. Noorani drew attention to the glaring factual errors advanced in Left Supremo Prakash Karat's reading of the 123 and the Hyde Act and concluded that Bush's signing the statement on the Hyde Act was "pro-India".

Why is this so-called nuclear deal important for India? What is the realpolitik relevance for our country? J 1805 has the potential to liberate India from the technology denial regimes and the politico-diplomatic ostracism that has been its cross to bear since May 1974 and, in many ways, to admit India into the global panchayat as a credible member. This admittance was being facilitated by Bush. From the inflexible 'estrangement' over the nuclear nettle, the India-US bilateral relationship exuded signs of moving towards a mutually beneficial 'engagement'.

Clearly, this policy shift is at a complete variance with the ideological position of the Left parties, for who anti-Americanism is an article of faith. In the case of the BJP, the picture is more complex. The National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government deserves credit for its May 1998 initiative and the manner in which it restored relations with the Washington Beltway, culminating in the Clinton visit to Delhi in March 2000. Who could have accused the Indian Parliament of being anti-US when Clinton received what must rank as the longest and most enthusiastic standing ovation when he addressed a Joint Session of Parliament at the time?

The BJP and the Left have now found common cause in stoking anti-Americanism in the Indian polity. While this is being interpreted as cynical pre-election posturing, it is moot as to how much of this will translate into tangible electoral gains —even if the election is held well before mid-2009. Thus, what we are now witnessing is the entry of manipulative racism and prickly nationalism into the domestic political discourse. Hence, engaging with the US is deemed suspect and denounced as being inimical to India's sovereignty even if such an assertion is counterfactual. The subtext of this articulation is that India is better off as part of an elusive Asian solidarity leading to global multipolarity wherein China and perhaps Russia will play the lead role, with India in a complementary role.

This is doubly ironic, considering that over the past 50 years, China and the US have often acted in a manner that has thwarted India's security and strategic interests to advance their own agendas. It merits recall that Beijing had little hesitation during the latter phase of the Cold War to tango with Washington against Moscow. This abiding tenet of international relations appears to have been lost sight of in the current emotive Indian debate.

The current global strategic grid has three major nodes of relevance—the US, Russia, and China. (The European Union and Japan are already part of the US framework.) India has the potential to be part of this grid, and it was this deeper intent that impelled J 1805—with tacit support from Moscow. An enabled India, free of the fetters of technology denial and strategic outcaste status, will be a swing-state of considerable relevance in the 21st century. This would have made for some degree of credible multipolarity to emerge at the global level. This profile would have allowed India to deal more effectively with the principal players on the global stage without being subaltern to anyone.

To that extent, the highly visible nuclear strand of J 1805 was both symbolic and substantive—the former to herald India's strategic 'liberalisation' and the latter to ensure tangible gains such as the import of nuclear fuel et al. If the Opposition parties have their way and J 1805 is either delayed or scuttled, then the world at large will come to an irrefutable conclusion: that India's political spectrum prefers to remain insular; a country of one billion people with multiple aspirations will not be part of the global management grid; the Indian state will remain obsessed with more domestic persuasions such as caste, reservations and communal issues. The world will move on and the major players will set the agenda—be it on politico-strategic issues or the regulation of trade and technology and energy and environmental challenges.

Paradoxically, what the world is seeking from India—access to its middleclass market and the new technology-savvy human resource—will flourish. The Indian public that can afford them will not be denied the latest mobile phones and education-cum-employment opportunities abroad. With the obstruction to J 1805, the net result will be a stunted Indian state fending off technology denial regimes and placed below the global management hierarchy as a permanent 'outsider', while the Indian public will be increasingly drawn into the vortex of globalisation—on unfavourable terms.

Some facts about India are inexorable—for instance, its economic and technology potential. The country is already a US$ 1 trillion economy, and there is a sense that we do not need J 1805. This is misleading. India's energy needs have not been met either by hydroelectric potential or coal for 50 years. Unless there is unfettered access to technology, investment, markets and higher education, much of India's proven potential will be suboptimally exploited. The timeline for realising the various interlocking procedures such as the International Atomic Energy Agency protocol and the Nuclear Suppliers Group concurrence is very tight. And, above all, the concatenation of circumstances in the US is most favourable now. This may not be the case in early 2009 if there is a change of party in the White House.

On the occasion of the 60th anniversary of Indian independence, one truism about Indian politics is self-evident. The manner in which Manmohan Singh is being pilloried over the India-US deal proves the adage that honesty, personal integrity, merit and the larger national interest will always be trumped by narrow self-interest in the Indian political arena.

( Uday Bhaskar is a senior defence and strategic affairs analyst).