No breakthrough, no breakdown

One may aver that while there has been no breakthrough in Indo-Pak relations in the past two years, it is cause for some deep, albeit quiet, satisfaction that there has been no breakdown, either C Uday Bhaskar

The just concluded two-day foreign secretary-level talks between India and Pakistan (January 18) in Delhi are an extension of the composite dialogue process that has its genesis in the January 2004 agreement between then prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf. At the time, India agreed to discuss all issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, subject to Gen Musharraf making a commitment that Pakistan would not support any form of terrorism against India and, furthermore, would not allow its territory to be used for such purpose. It was evident at the time that both sides had taken great care to respect the sensitivities of the other, and while J&K was specifically mentioned to provide manoeuvring room for Gen Musharraf, the abiding Indian concern about terrorism was couched under the rubric of peace and security, and related confidence building measures.

Two years down, the joint statement issued on January 18 noted inter alia that the two sides “discussed issues related to 'peace and security, including CBMs' and 'Jammu and Kashmir'. The talks were held in a cordial atmosphere and were constructive…on the issue of peace and security, including CBMs, the two foreign secretaries reviewed and assessed positively the progress made during the meetings of experts on nuclear and conventional CBMs.” Adjectives and the turn of phrase in joint statements are the warp and weft of complex and contested diplomatic negotiations, and historically Indo-Pak parleys are distinctive for the subtext in such official texts. Reviewing the January 2006 statement, one may aver that while there has been no dramatic breakthrough in Indo-Pak relations in the past two years, it is cause for some deep, albeit quiet satisfaction that there has been no breakdown in the composite dialogue process.

If state-level negotiations seemed cautious, a very encouraging contrast was provided at the people-to-people level and this was reflected in ample measure in the ongoing Indo-Pak cricket series. Cricket lovers were following the fortunes of their willow-wielding icons such as Younis Khan, Md Yousuf, Virender Sehwag and Rahul Dravid, as batting records tumbled. This was complemented by a much greater degree of travel between both sides, thanks to a more enabling visa regime and the resurrection of a number of transport links. And one can personally vouch for the warmth and affection displayed when common people have travelled to the other country. The most encouraging sign is that the ‘other’ is no longer perceived as the ‘enemy’ and a deep seated yearning to build on the current thaw is more than palpable.

However, much as one would like to herald these developments as positive steps, they remain modest steps that augur well but have an inherent glass-ceiling that will limit their utility at the strategic level. Pakistan is a state where the military has accorded unto itself a primacy in governance by defining what constitutes national interest and the challenges and threats to national security. In this construct, India is the Hindu enemy, now diluted to adversary, and historical record indicates that since the 1965 war to Kargil 1999, the Pakistani fauj has adopted a revisionist agenda using various stratagems, including covert operations (wherein terrorism has been the deliberately preferred tool), to redress what it perceives as a territorial injustice apropos Kashmir. This mindset has not changed in any convincingly discernible and permanent manner, and as long as this characteristic does not change, it is unlikely that there will be any really radical improvement. Hence, Kashmir becomes the touchstone for all negotiations from the Pakistani perspective and truly big steps remain congenitally stillborn.

This was more than evident in the coincidence of January 17-18, when talks were being held in Delhi. On January 17 in Islamabad, the Pakistani cabinet decided to defer the decision to ratify SAFTA. The reason was the K word—the conviction that progress on trade would weaken Islamabad's ability to negotiate on Kashmir. However, some political developments and related articulation by leaders on both sides suggest that there is a glimmer of hope that India and Pakistan can still find a modus vivendi about J&K that will be acceptable to both sides and the people, but this is still very nascent. Until then, the composite dialogue will continue in this manner—no breakthrough, but no breakdown either.