Gowda's gambit

The Congress played dirty with Deve Gowda, who played dirty right back. The BJP hopes to reap the whirlwind, but its prescience is questionable.

The fall of the Karnataka government headed by Congress leader Dharam Singh was actually the result of a calculated risk gone wrong taken by the Congress. The Congress refused to resolve issues raised by former Prime Minister HD Deve Gowda and his colleagues in his Janata Dal (Secular) party, leading to the revolt by his son, Kumaraswamy and other partymen. Deve Gowda and his colleagues in the JD (S) harboured many grievances against the Congress, which the latter did not heed.

The fact that Dharam Singh's days were numbered became clear when Deve Gowda went to the Election Commission on January 16 to meet the chief election commissioner. But the CEC was absent, so Deve Gowda met election commissioner Navin Chawla, a known Nehru-Gandhi family loyalist, and asked him if it would be possible to hold elections in Karnataka along with the other five states going to the polls this year if the state assembly was dissolved in the second week of February. Chawla answered in the affirmative.

Last time round, the Bharatiya Janata Party had emerged as the single-largest party in the assembly elections but was far short of the majority Plimsoll line. The Congress, which had a majority in the outgoing House, was left with only 65 MLAs. The biggest gainer was Deve Gowda's JD (S), which came in like a dark horse to win 59 seats. Together, the Congress and the JD (S) decided to form a ‘secular’ government.

Deve Gowda wanted the new government to follow the Jammu and Kashmir model, which would entail a party with the fewer MLAs heading the coalition government—in short, the chief ministership. His argument was that clearly the people's verdict had worked against the Congress and so it shouldn't lead.

But the Congress stuck to the ‘majority MLAs’ argument. A coalition government was duly formed, with a Congress chief minister. Deve Gowda then announced that the two parties had agreed to share power according to the majoritarian Maharashtra model.

In the days that followed, however, it became clear that what Deve Gowda had announced was his party's understanding of the arrangement and not a validation of the Congress view. Complicating matters was the fact that the Congress refused to part with the crucial home and irrigation portfolios (which in Maharashtra had been given to the junior partner and, therefore, should have gone to the JD(S) in Karnataka). Besides, the JD (S) had expected the Congress to share the chairpersonship of various boards and corporations, again according to the Maharashtra model.

The JD(S) was incensed. Deve Gowda lodged a protest with Congress president Sonia Gandhi, but to no avail. Even as resentment among the JD(S) rank and file simmered, Congress strategists expected Deve Gowda to snap the coalition and join hands with the BJP. They thought that turning quisling would undermine the JD(S)'s position as a secular alternative to the Congress in Karnataka. It couldn't have been much consolation for the Congress that Deve Gowda refused to take the bait.

Then came the proverbial last straw that broke the camel's back. Deputy chief minister Siddaramaiah, who was second only to Deve Gowda in the JD (S) hierarchy, walked out of the party with a clutch of MLAs. The Congress hailed Siddaramaiah as a ‘great leader’ and associated with an outfit he floated in the local elections.

Deve Gowda—indeed, the entire JD(S) leadership—had no doubt that it was the Congress that had egged Siddaramaiah on. "First, the Congress humiliated Deve Gowda and went back on its coalition promises, hoping that the JD(S) would walk across to the BJP, which was waiting with open arms," says a senior JD(S) leader. "When this did not happen, Congressmen, annoyed with the growing popularity of the JD(S), resorted to desperate measures, meeting MLAs individually and offering them money. They persuaded Siddaramaiah to split the JD(S) and promised to make him chief minister if he managed to lead enough MLAs out of the JD(S). Even then, Deve Gowda did not react—he merely complained to Sonia Gandhi. But, clearly, other leaders were not as patient as Deve Gowda."

For the Congress, it was a win-win situation. Had Siddaramaiah succeeded, there would have been a government without Deve Gowda, whose strength would have been seriously diminished. The problem is that even as his tactics failed, Siddaramaiah managed to cut into Deve Gowda's votes, as was evident in the local elections.

But it wasn't a big enough blow to decapitate Deve Gowda. The Congress then decided to literally propel the man towards the BJP. But Deve Gowda turned the tables on them by cannily letting his son, HD Kumaraswamy, walk out with enough MLAs to form a government with the help of the BJP. Now, the JD(S) gets to head the state government even as Deve Gowda ostensibly keeps his distance from the BJP. It doesn't take a genius to know that Kumaraswamy's new outfit is likely to dump the BJP before the next elections and return to its parent party. Once again, with matters back to 'normal', the BJP, the Congress and the JD(S) will fight the elections separately. The BJP is playing along with Kumaraswamy because it hopes to become more acceptable to those voters who were anti-Congress but were wary of its communal agenda. Also, following a stint in government with the JD(S)'s 'rebel' faction, the BJP aims to cut into its votes, hoping that the JD(S) will have been weakened by its proximity with the BJP. A government formed with JD(S) rebels would, therefore, take the BJP closer to realising its aim of ushering the state towards a bipolar polity by eliminating the third player, the JD(S) itself.

This is Machiavellian scheming at its best, the only justice being that no one is going to come out clean.